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THE BRITISH PLAN of Lord Keynes for an International Clearing Union and
the United States Treasury plan for an International Stabilization Fund
(known as the White plan), both of which were originally announced in
April 1943, are efforts toward greater international cooperation in monetary
matters. They are evidence that exchange stability is considered a major post-
war problem. Both are tentative proposals offered by technical experts as a
basis for .study and discussion.1 On the basis of discussions with experts of
the various countries, the U. S. Treasury Department released a revised draft
of its proposal on August 20, 1943, which is still considered tentative; the re-
vised draft has been used in this study.
This analysis presents a brief comparison of the main features of the two
plans, and a short commentary intended to make clear some of the difficulties
that may be encountered in applying them. Another section treats the ob-
stacles that may beset any general stabilization plan inaugurated now or in
the immediate postwar period, and the financial effects that such plans may
be expected to produce. The final section considers an alternative method of
treating the problem, the key-country approach.
1 Canadian experts, after studying the Keynes and White plans, prepared tentative draft pro-
posals for an International Exchange Union, which were made public in July 1943bythe Cana-
dian Minister of Finance, the Hon. J. L. lIsley. This Canadian plan embodies important features
of both the Keynes and White plans, but has greater similarity to the White plan. It provides for
an International Exchange Union with a capital fund of $8 billion, and, in addition, member
countries could be required to make loans to the Union iii amounts up to 50percentof their
quotas. In its concepts, techniques, and general powers, however, it is very similar to the White
plan. For that reason it has not been thought necessary to include in this study an analysis of
the Canadian plan.
IFEATURES OF THE PLANS
Each plan. provides a mechanism for granting foreign credits to member
countries and for trying to promote conditions under which payments be-
tween countries arising out of international transactions may tend to be
brought into balance and maintained in a state of equilibrium. The term
"Clearing Union" is not an accurate description of the agency proposed by
Keynes because it is essentially a credit mechanism rather than a clearing
mechanism.
Each plan provides for a new international monetary unit which would be
used br tying the various currencies to gold and to each other. The new
unit would be used for accounting purposes but not for circulation. In the
Keynes plan, the unit of account is called "bancor"; in the White plan, it is
called "unitas." Each would have a with gold and with
the curré each member state. Hence, each plan involves a dthnite re-
lationship between the currencies of the various countries and gold.
Both plans contemplate the use of gold in settling international balances,
and both provide an unlimited market for gold at the established price. Mem-
ber countries may buy and sell gold freely at the fixed value, but the White
plan seems to place the greater emphasis on the importance of gold as an
international standard of value. The gold value of unitas could be changed
only with the approval of 85 percent of the member votes; that of bancor
presumably could be changed by majority vote. The Keynes plan does not
favor full two-way convertibility, and suggests that if member countries
should prefer to maintain full convertibility for internal purposes, they might
permit the export of gold only under license as a protective measure.
The adherence of the White plan to gold, and its objective of stabilizing
currencies in relation to gold, implies that the dollar price of gold will not
again be manipulated to influence domestic commodity prices.
In each plan the international agency would deal only with the central
banks, treasuries or fiscal agents of the member countries, and, according to
their sponsors, would not interfere with the existing agencies or methods of
financing international transactions. Central banks or treasuries would keep
accounts with the International Clearing Union or Fund, in
terms of bancor or unitas as the case might be, and would use the central
agency for dealing with exchange balances between countries.
The process of granting credits differs somewhat in the two plans. The
Cleariflg Union of the Keynes plan, having no funds to begin with, would
provide to member countries. For example, if country A
country B, the Clearing Union would debit A and
credit B. A country having a favorable balance of payments with the rest of
2the world as a whole would find itself building up a credit account with the
Clearing Union in terms of bancor. In other words, the creditor countries
as a group would, in effect, be extending credits to the debtor countries as
a group.
The importer in the debtor country would deposit funds with his bank
as usual for goods received and, if exchange were not available in the ex-
porter's country, the importer's bank would deposit the funds in its own cen-
tral bank. The central bank would simply credit the Clearing Union. The
exporter in the creditor country would receive pay from his bank as usual
for goods, shipped. His bank would be reimbursed by the central bank of
that country and the latter would debit the Clearing Union. The net result
would be that the country with excess payments. would develop a debit bal-
ance with the Union and the country with excess receipts would develop a
credit balance with the Union.
The Stabilization Fund of the White plan, having assets to begin wit.h,
would ge one currency for another or buy one currency and sell
means of increasing its supply of any
currency, i.e., by borrowing or by selling some of its assets. In both plans
measures are contemplated that would limit the amount of credit extended
to any country.
SIMILARITY OF OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the two plans are similar. They would attempt immediate
over-all stabilization of foreign exchange rates and try to promote conditions
under which stability can be maintained. They would seek to reduce foreign
exchange controls that interfere with world trade, and would help to elim-
inate bilateral exchange clearings, multiple currency devices, blocked bal-
ances, and discriminating foreign exchange practices. In general the aim
would be to promote and maintain equilibrium in international transactions.
After the last war efforts to stabilize currencies were sporadic and unco-
ordinated; some countries undervalued and some overvalued. Instances oc-
curred when the decision of one country to change the value of its currency
caused others to follow suit. One country's difficulties led to the imposition
of various exchange controls and trade restrictions. These in turn sometimes
led to retaliatory measures by other countries, and variations in exchange
rates were used as measures of economic warfare.
These monetary difficulties were in part the result of a lack of general
economic cooperation among the countries of the world. Tariff barriers and
other trade restrictions added to the monetary troubles, and monetary troubles
in turn increased trade difficulties, retarding the establishment of balanced
international economic relations. Disequilibria were obscured for a period
3by the flow of capital, much of it short-term, from creditor to debtor nations,
but the borrowing nations were building up economies that could continue
only on the basis of a constant inflow of new loans. This increased the uki-
mate strain on the international monetary organization.
International economic relations may be even more difficult to adjust after
the present war, and the problem that concerns governments today is how
to prevent the same kind of chaos that prevailed in the world's monetary
and trade relationships during much of the 1920'S and 1930's. This war has
been far more destructive than the previous one and has created greater dis-
locations, both in international economic relations and in the internal econ-
omies of many countries—especially the Continental European countries.
The proposed credit agencies are not designed to finance relief and re-
construction, and the sponsors of the plans recognize the need for other
agencies to provide funds for these activities. The feasibility of making a
distinction in actual operations, however, is doubtful. The stabilization
agency would finance passive balances, and the passive balance of a coun-
try would be due to the fact that it needs, or buys, the world's goods in excess
of its ability to export. The establishment of other agencies to supply the
needs for relief and reconstruction would ease the burden on the stabilization
agency but might not relieve it entirely from supplying such needs.
There are still important differences in details between the two plans, but
discussions are continuing in an effort to remove such differences and to de-
termine the nature of the difficultiesinvolved in any over-all stabilization plan.
MEMBERSHIP AND ADDITIONS TO MEMBERSHIP2
WHITE PLAN—An International Stabilization Fund will be established in which
all the United Nations and those nations associated with them in this war will
participate.
KEYNES PLAN—All the United Nations will be invited to become original mem-
bers of the International Clearing Union. Other states may be invited to join sub-
sequently. If ex-enemy states are invited to join, special conditions may be applied
to them.
Postwar help in rehabilitating the ex-enemy countries and in aiding the
stabilization of their exchanges is partly a political question. Some aid to ex-
enemy countries may be required, however, if we are to attain the desired
economic order in the world. The greatest need for stabilization aid will
probably be felt by the ex-enemy countries, by the eastern and southeastern
European countries, and perhaps by China. South American countries as
well as a few of the European countries may have enough gold and foreign
2 In the following comparisons of the technical features of the two plans, the wording frequently
follows closely that used in the documents themselves.
4exchange to tide them over the initial stabilization period without large
credits, although some of them may need relief aid and long-term recon-
struction loans.
QUOTAS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES
WHITE PLAN—This plan sets up a Fund of at leastbillion consisting of cur-
rencies and securities of member governments and of gold. Each country would
subscribe a specific quota to this Fund, the quotas to be determined by some
agreed-upon formula which takes into consideration such factors as holdings of
gold and free foreign exchanges, magnitude and fluctuations in balances of inter-
national payments, and national income. On or before the date set for the Fund's
operations to begin, each country would meet its quota contribution in full, partly
in gold and partly in local currencies and securities. Any changes in the formula
by which the quotas are determined would require a four-fifths vote of the Board.
Quotas would be adjusted on the basis of the most recent data three years after
the establishment of the Fund and at five-year intervals thereafter in accordance
with the agreed-upon formula but any increase of a quota must be approved by
the representative of the country concerned. Where a quota is clearly inequitable
it may be increased during the period between adjustment dates.
KEYNES PLAN—No provision is made under this plan for a fund or stated assets
at the time of organization, it merely sets up a Clearing Union that would
lish overdraft facilities for member countries. The Union would settle balances
between countries simply by debiting one and crediting the other. The extent of
these transactions would be regulated by the quotas assigned to each member
country. The initial quotas might be fixed by reference to the sum of each coun-
try's exports and imports on the average of (say) the three prewar years, and
might be (say) 75 percent of this amount. It is a matter for discussion whether
the formula should take into account other factors. After the lapse of the transition
period quotas would be revised annually.
One important difference between the two pians is the determination of
quotas for member countries, i.e., the extent of their participation. Quotas are
used not only as a basis for determining rights to credit facilities, but also
as a measure of voting power.
The sum of the quotas under the White plan would be fixed at a mini-
mum of $5 billion. If all but ex-enemy countries should join the Clearing
Union, the sum of the quotas under the Keynes plan, however, would aggre-
gate about $30 billion on the basis of 1936-38 trade figures. The United King-
dom would have about i6 percent of the total, the British Empire about35
percent, and the United States about 14 percent. If fewer countries should
join, the total of all quotas would be less, and each member country would
have a larger proportion of the total.
Under the Keynes plan foreign countries could in theory accumulate debits
of nearly $26billion.That is a theoretical limit based on the assumption that
5the United States would be the only creditor country3 and all others would
be debtor countries, and further that none of the safeguards provided for
worked. That would not occur, of course, but it might be possible after a
period of years for debit balances to reach half that figure, or even more, if
creditor countries should continue to supply the funds without making any
use of their credit balances.
In the case of the White plan, a country's quota represents the amount
which that country is obligated to bear in financing the plan. If the United
States' quota should be $2 billion, for example, that is the extent to which
the United States is obligated to contribute. The United States, however,
could contribute more by lending additional dollars to the Fund or by mak-
ing other special arrangements to supply dollars. In the Keynes plan, on the
other hand, a country's share in the financing would depend on the size of
the credit balance it accumulates, which could conceivably equal the sum of
the debit balances of all other member countries.
The borrowing facilities provided under the Keynes plan seem unusually
large to be used merely for short-term stabilization credits. The size of the
quotas raises the question as to whether the borrowing facilities might not
be used for other purposes.
DETERMINATION OF RATES OF EXCHANGE
WHITE PLAN—Initial rates of exchange shall be based upon the value of the cur-
rency in terms of United States dollars which prevailed on July i,1943, orif that
should be inappropriate, the rate would be determined by consultation betu'ecn
the member country and the Fund. For a member country which has been occu-
pied by the enemy, the rate would be fixed by the liberated country in consultation
with the Fund and at a level acceptable to the Fund. The Fund shall determine
the range within which the rates may fluctuate.
After an initial period, changes in rates could be made only with the approval
of three-fourths of the member votes including the representative of the country
concerned. During the first three years of the Fund's operation, however, changes
may be made with the approval of a majority of member votes, and a member
country may change the rate for its currency by zs much as io percent without
the approval of the Fund, provided it shall notify the Fund of its intention and
consult with the Fund on the advisability of the action.
KEYNES PLAN—This plan contemplates that some general agreement will be
reached between the member countries regarding the relative values of the differ-
ent currencies before the plan goes into effect. No indication is given as to the
methods that might be used to determine the initial rates or the factors that should
be taken into consideration.
Changes in rates could not be made without the permission of the Governing
Board of the Clearing Union, except that a member country could change its rate
"Creditor country," as used in this report, means a country with a favorable balance of pay-
ments, and "debtor country" means a country with an unfavorable balance of payments.
6once as much as 5 percent without the approval of the Board, provided its debit
balance has exceeded a quarter of its quota on the average of at least two years.4
The attempt to stabilize rates for all countries immediately after the war
before general political and economic stability has been restored and to sup-
port these rates by credit would encounter serious obstacles. It might not be
easy to obtain the necessary votes for a change and action by the Fund (or
Union) might lag behind activities in the exchange market. Political bar-
gaining might delay needed actions. The problem of immediate over-all
stabilization is reserved for general comment at the end of this analysis.
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
WHIm PLAN—Each country shall have a representative on the Board of Directors,
which shall meet annually. The Board would appoint a Managing Director and
also an Executive Committee of not less than eleven members which would be
continuously available at the head office of the Fund to exercise the authority
delegated by the Board. It is suggested that each country might have ioo votes
plus one vote for each ioo,ooo unitas ($i million) of its quota, except on questions
of the sale of foreign exchange and membership. No country, however, may cast
more than one-fifth of the total votes. In general, a majority vote would govern
except on certain specified questions where a vote of 75, 8o orpercent would
be required.
PLAN—The Keynes plan provides for a Governing Board not to exceed
(say) twelve to fifteen members. The states with the larger quotas would have
individual representation on the Board but the states with the smaller quotas
might be arranged into convenient political or geographical groups, each group
appointing a representative. Member states not individually represented on the
Board might appoint permanent delegates to the Union to maintain contacts and
act as liaison. Each representative on the Governing Board would have votes in
proportion to the quota of the state or states appointing him, except on a proposal
to increase a particular quota in which case there would be a modification of the
voting power.
Under the White plan no country would have more than 20 percent of
the votes. Under the Keynes formula for quotas, assuming all but ex-enemy
countries would join the Union, the United Kingdom would have i6 per-
cent of the votes, the British Empire 35 percent, and the United States 14
percent, as shown above.
The voice that each country will have in the management will probably
be one of the difficult points of agreement. The United States, as the largest
Keynes, however, allows a five-year periodin which appealsfor changesin exchange
rates shall be given special consideration if made on the grounds of unforeseen circumstances.
In addition he points out in his article, Objective of International Price Stability' Tile
Economic Journal, London, June-September 1943,pp.185-87, that changes in exchange rates
which become necessary as a consequence of varying price policies in the member countries, are
to be made whenever the contingency arises. Only changes in exchange rates consequent to
shortages in means of foreign payments are to be avoided.
7creditor country, will make the greatest contribution, whatever plan may be
adopted, and probably will expect to have a substantial voice in the manage-
ment. On the other hand, the smaller countries, many of whom would make
genuine contributions to the success of the scheme, will be exceptionally
sensitive to anything that smacks of domination by any one power, or any
two powers, for that matter. Political considerations will doubtless play a
part in the decisions regarding control, especially where the plan must be
approved by legislative bodies. It might be preferable, therefore, to divorce
the technical problem of the size of the quotas from the political problem of
control.
GENERAL POWERS
WHITE PLAN—The International Stabilization Fund shall have the following
powers:
a. To buy, sell, and hold gold, currencies, and government securities of
member countries; to transfer and earmark gold; to issue its own obligations
and discount or ofler them for sale in member countries.
b. To sell to any member country the currency of any member country which
the Fund holds, provided that the foreign exchange is required to meet an
adverse balance of payments predominantly on current account with the
country whole currency is being demanded. (There are definite limitations
on the Fund's holdings of the currency of any member country, but this will
be covered in a later section.) Under prescribed conditions the Fund may
also sell foreign exchange to a member country to facilitate the transfer of
capital, or the repayment or adjustment of foreign debts.
c. To buy and sell currencies of non-member countries under certain con-
ditions; to borrow the currency of any member country; to sell member
countly obligations owned by the Fund, provided the representatives of the
country issuing the obligation as well as the country in which the securities
arc to be sold approve; to obtain rediscounts or advances from central banks;
to invest its currency holdings in government securities of the country of that
currency provided the representative of the country approves; to lend to any
member country its local currency, within limitations; and to levy upon
member countries a pro rata share of the expenses.
KEYNES PLAN—The Clearing Union shall have power to set up the machinery
for extending credits and clearing balances, to fix the value of bancor in terms of
gold, to change the value of individual currencies in terms of bancor under certain
conditions, to reduce or raise quotas, to reduce the quotas of all members in the
same pro portion if deemed necessary, to recommend and discuss with member
states measures for correcting continuous debit or credit balances, and to ask
member states for relevant statistical or other information.
The Keynes plan provides for a lending mechanism without other broad
banking powers, and, on the surface, seems the simpler plan, even though it
provides more extensive credit facilities. The White plan endows the Stabil-
ization Fund with powers to engage in a wide variety of international bank-
8ing operations. It could lend and borrow money, and deal in securities. The
fact that it could borrow money and issue its own obligations might bring
the Fund's activities nearer the scope of the Keynes Union. In. spite of its
limited size some criticism has been directed at the Stabilization Fund be-
cause it would be able to carry on extensive activities. These general banking
powers which the Fund would have, however, do not seem to be any more
comprehensive than those now possessed by the Bank for International Set.
tlements. The purpose of these powers is to enable the Fund to cooperate
effectively with the monetary authorities of the member countries.
It has been suggested that an institution which can engage in these broad
banking activities might compete with existing commercial banks and inter-
fere with the regular channels of international trade and international bank-
ing. The plan provides, however, that the Fund shall deal only with or
through treasuries and central banks. Therefore, the Fund could not
engage in general banking activities except with the consent of the member
countries involved; instead, it would use its powers to cooperate with the local
monetary authorities.. Mr. Morgenthau said of the Stabilization Fund, when
it was originally announced: "It would not compete with private banks or
existing agencies. Its operations would be maintained only to supplement
the efforts made by each member government to maintain monetary stability.
The established channels of international trade and international banking
would be retained in full for all international transactions."
This contention would probably be true so far as it relates to the financing
of specific international transactions. In a broader sense, however, such a
method of extending credits to settle international balances might reduce the
amount of credits that would otherwise be extended through existing
facilities.
Some interference with existing agencies and practices might also seem
to be implied in the provision that each member country shall agree to offer
to the Fund one-half of its additional acquisitions of free and liquid foreign
exchange and gold in excess of its holdings at the time it became a member,
and to discourage the unnecessary accumulation of foreign balances by its
nationals. The purpose of that provision, however, is to safeguard the Fund
against the misuse of its resources by a member country. With that provision
a country could not continue to buy foreign exchange from the Fund while
at the same time accumulating excessive holdings of gold and foreign ex-
change independently. No country would be under obligation to sell gold
and foreign exchange to the Fund except for its local currency or foreign
currencies acceptable to it. A creditor country, of whose currency the Fund
has only a small or moderate amount, would not sell additional accumula-
9tions of gold and foreign exchange to the Fund because the Fund would not
have the local currency to pay for such purchases.
The Fund is also given power to deal in securities and to make loans, but
it is doubtful whether these operations would compete with existing banking
institutions. The purpose of these powers seems to be to permit countries
without adequate money markets and with rigid monetary systems to offset
any expansionist or contractionist effect that their dealings with the Fund
might otherwise have. Such activities can be undertaken only with the ap-
proval of the member country.
Concerning his plan, Keynes states: "No transaction in bancor will take
place except when a member State or its Central B.ank is exercising the right
to pay in it... .Thusthe fabric of international banking organisation, built up
by long experience to satisfy practical needs, would be left as undisturbed
as possible."
THE PROBLEM OF DEBIT BALANCES
WHITE PLAN—The Fund's holdings of the currency and securities of any member
country shall not exceed that country's quota by more thanpercent during the
first year of operation, or by more than zoo percent thereafter except as otherwise
provided. The total holdings thus permitted are termed quota. With
the speci fic approval of the Board the permissible quota may be exceeded provided
at least one of the following conditions is met:
a.in the judgment of the Fund satisfactory measures are being or will be
taken by the country whose currency is being acquired to correct the dis-
equilibrium in the country's balance of payments, or
b.it is believed that the excess accumulation will be temporary.
it is further provided that when the Fund's holdings of any member country's
currency fall below 20percentof the country's quota, the sale of such currency
shall require approval of the country's representative.
When the Fund's holdings of any local currency and securities exceed the
permissible quota, that country may be required to deposit collateral with the
Fund. When a member country, whose currency and securities held by the Fund
exceed its quota, is exhausting its permissible quota more rapidly than seems war-
ranted, or is using its permissible quota in a manner that clearly has the effect
of preventing or unduly delaying the establishment of a sound balance in its inter-
national accounts, the Fund may place such conditions upon additional sales of
foreign exchange to that country as it deems to be in the general interest of the
Fund. A charge of not less than ipercentper annum payable in gold may be
levied against any member country on the amount of its currency held by the
Fund in excess of the quota of that country. An additional charge, also payable in
gold, shall be levied against holdings of a member's currency in excess of the
permissible quota. A country whose debit balance exceeds the quota, however,
may repurchase the excess by paying to the Fund gold or acceptable foreign ex-
change. As pointed out above, each member country agrees that it will offer to
sell to the Fund, for its local currency or for foreign exchange which it needs,
one-half of the gold and foreign exchange it acquires in excess of its official hold-
ings at the time it became a member of the Fund.
I0KEYNES PLAN—A member state may not increase its debit balance by more than
a quarter of its quota within a year without permission of the Governing Board.
I/its debit balance has exceeded one-fourth of its quota on the average of at least
two years, it may reduce ihe value of its currency in terms of bancor without the
consent of the Governing Board, provided the reduction shall not exceed 5 per-
cent. But this procedure cannot be repeated without the approval of the Board.
The Governing Board may require a member state having a debit balance equal
to half its quota to deposit suitable collateral. As a condition of allowing a member
state to increase its debit balance to more than half its quota, the Board may re-
quire all or any of the following measures:
a. A reduction in the value of the member's currency.
b. The control of outward capital transactions, and
c. The surrender of a suitable proportion of any separate gold or other liquid
reserve it may have in reduction of its debit balance.
Furthermore, the Governing Board may recommend to the member state any in-
ternal measures affecting its domestic economy that may appear appropriate to
restore the equilibrium of its international balance.
if a member state's debit balance has exceeded three-fourths of its quota on the
average of at least a year and is excessive in the opinion of the Governing Board,
or is increasing at an excessive rate in relation to the total debit balances outstand-
ing on the books, it may be asked to take measures to improve its position. In the
event of its failing to reduce its debit balance within two years, the Board may
declare it in default and no longer entitled to draw against its account except
with permission.
A member state shall pay i percent per annum on the amount of its average
bancor balance which is in excess of one-fourth of its quota, whether it is a debit
or a credit balance; and a further charge of i percent on its average balance in
excess of one-half of its quota, whether credit or debit. Thus only a country which
keeps in a state of approximate international balance on the average of a year
will escape this contribution.
The matter of dealing with debit balances would be the major problem
of any international agency set up 'to stabilize exchanges. It is here that the
mechanism would succeed or break down. Both institutions are postwar
lending agencies designed to give debtor countries time to make their adjust-
ments and bring their payments into balance. Presumably the efforts of the
stabilization agency would be supplemented by programs. for relief and re-
construction loans. To prevent the agency from being utilized for those
purposes would be difficult, however, because whatever would increase the
passive balance of payments would create .a demand on the agency. There-
fore, there is little likelihood that its operations would be limited to supply-
ing short-term credits. Political and economic stability, moreover, go hand in
hand with exchange stability and there are many basic causes of disequi-
librium which may not be cured by loans and credits.
One striking feature of both plans is that no tests or standards are set up
for debtor countries in making initial credits. An open line of credit is made
IIavailable to all member countries without imposing upon them any initial re-
quirenients, except the general obligations assumed when they become mem-
bers. The White plan does provide that after a member country has bor-
rowed from the Fund an amount in excess of its gold contribution to the
Fund, the Fund may place conditions upon additional sales of foreign ex-
change to that country. The author of the plan apparently has much faith
in the protective value of that provision. However, it would be very difficult
at that stage of operations for the Fund to refuse credit to a country that
had just become a member in the belief that it had a line of credit equal to
its defined permissible quota. It would not be easy to determine when such
a country was exhausting its permissible quota too fast or to appraise the
probable effectiveness of its efforts to put its house in order. The tendency
might be for the Fund to be too generous rather than too strict.
Both plans assume that member states will act in good faith and that
they will undertake whatever internal measures may be necessary to main-
tain equilibrium in their international payments. Whether this would be a
sufficient safeguard to make it a sound system of credits is questionable.
The creditworthiness of member countries would vary greatly and it would
be difficult to prevent some of them from taking advantage of a line of
credit. This might be especially true under the Keynes plan because of the
large credit facilities provided.
The White plan is not very specific as to what measures the Board of
Directors may take to induce the correction of excessive debit balances. It
simply says that certain limits may be exceeded if in the judgment of the
Fund satisfactory measures are being or will be taken by the country to
correct disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The Keynes plan says that
the Board may require a reduction in the value of a member's currency or
the control of capital exports or the surrender of gold and other reserves.
A central board with a capable technical staff will presumably be in a posi-
tion to diagnose the exchange troubles of any debtor country and to recom-
mend corrective measures.
Whether the causes of the difficulties can be remedied within a reasonable
time depends on how deep-seated they may be or how much effort member
countries may exert in that direction. A lack of balance is not always a
temporary matter. The trend of payments may run consistently in one direc-
tion, and the granting of credits may simply postpone the necessity for tak-
ing corrective measures. The member countries make only general commit-
ments to take corrective measures, and if the need calls for strenuous action
they may hesitate and delay. The size and variability of the debit balances
would be the test of the success of the plan, and would determine whether
the credits extended are really capital (long-term) loans.
12CONTROL OVER SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
WHITE PLAN—Member countries agree to cooperate in regulating capital move-
ments in various ways, including:
a. The refusal to accept deposits, securities or investments from the nationals
of anymembercountry imposing restrictions on capital exports except on per-
mission of that country and the Fund; and
b. The furnishing of full information on property in the form of deposits,
securities and investments held in their respective jurisdictions by the na-
tionals of a country restricting capital exports.
KEYNES PLAN—As a condition of allowing a member stat; to increase its debit
balance to more than half its quota, the Board may require, among other measures,
the control of outward capital transactions, as pointed out previously.
Keynes says that it is widely held that the control of capital movements, both
inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the postwar system. But
he holds that such control cannot be regarded as essential to the operation of the
Clearing Union, and therefore proposes that it should be left to the decision of
each member state. It would be of great advantage, he declares, if the United States
and other members of the Union would adopt machinery similar to that of the
British Exchange Control, so that records of international movements of funds
would be available.
While both plans contemplate control over international movements of
capital, this control would be exercised by the member countries themselves
with the approval of the Stabilization Fund or Clearing Union. This applies
largely, of course, to the flight of funds for political reasons or to evade do-
mestic taxation, or to any outflow of funds from debtor countries that lack
the means to finance such capital exports. Medium- and long-term loans by
creditor countries that will help to maintain equilibrium and develop the
world's resources will be encouraged, presumably by setting up an interna-
tional investment organization.
The question arises here as to whether ca.pital movements can be regulated
without control of practically all exchange transactions. There are so many
ways by which capital may be transferred that it is sometimes exceedingly
hard to discriminate between current account and capital account. What may
seem to be simple current transactions may turn out to be capital transfers.
Goods may be bought in one country and sold in another, thereby effecting
a transfer of capital. The nationals of a country which had built up a heavy
debit balance with the central agency might ship goods to
the United States and invest the proceeds here instead of reducing the debit
balance by turning over the dollars to the central agency. If exchange stabil-
ization should turn out to depend upon control of capital movements, it
might require the policing of all transactions. Hence, these plans might ex-
tend and perpetuate exchange controls instead of removing them.
Keynes says: "There is no country which can, in future, safely allow the
'3flight of funds for political reasons or to evade domestic taxation or in antici-
pation of the owner turning refugee. Equally, there is no country that can
safely receive fugitive funds, which constitute an unwanted import of capital,
yet cannot safely be used for fixed investment." This is a strong note of
nationalism and isreflected in both international plans.If,as Keynes
thinks, the postwar world will continue to have refugees and flights of cap-
ital for political reasons, conditions will scarcely be favorable for an over-all
stabilization scheme.5 Political stability has always been a sine qua non of ex-
change stability.
THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT BALANCES
WHITE PLAN—When the Fund's holdings of the currency and securities of a
member country become excessively small in relation to prospective acquisitions
and needs for that currency, the Fund will render to the country a report em-
bodying an analysis of the causes of the depletion of its holdings of that currency,
a forecast of the prospective balance of payments, and recommendations for in-
creasing the Fund's holdings of that currency. This report would be sent to all
member countries and, if deemed desirable, made public.
When it becomes evident to the Board of Directors that the Fund's holdings of
a particular currency will not be sufficient to meet all demands, steps will be
taken to see that the distribution is equitable. Furthermore, the Fund will make
every effort to increase the supply of the scarce currency.
The Fund has various ways of increasing its holdings of member country cur-
rencies. Perhaps the most important method is the power to borrow from central
banks, with the approval of the member countries concerned. The Fund may also
issue its own obligations and discount or offer them for sale in member countries.
Also "the Fund may make special arrangements with any member country for the
purpose of providing an emergency supply under appropriate conditions which
are acceptable to both the Fund and the member country." Thus, while there is
a definite limit to the original contribution, the United States and other creditor
countries might be asked to extend voluntarily additional amounts in order to
keep the plan operating.
KEYNES PLAN—A member state whose credit balance has exceeded half its quota
on the average of at least a year shall discuss with the Governing Board (but shall
retain the ultimate decision in its own hands) what measures would be appropriate
to restore the equilibrium of its international balances, including:
a. Measures for the expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand,
b. The appreciation of its local currency in terms of bancor, or, alternatively,
the encouragement of an increase in money rates of earnings,
c. The reduction of tariffs and other discouragements against imports, and
d. International development loans.
A member slate may obtain a credit balance in bancor by depositing gold with
5Imrede Vegh contends that: "A perpetuation and legalization of control over capital move-
ments is not compatible with any notion of a world that supposedly combats violence and dic-
tatorial forms of government." ("The International Clearing Union," The American Economic
Review, September 1943, p. 539.)
'4the Clearing Union, but no one is entitled to demand gold from the Union. The
Governing however, may at its discretion distribute any gold in its pos-
session to members possessing credit balances in excess of a specified proportion of
their quotas.
As previously stated, a member state would also be required to pay interest on
its credit balance above a certain amount.
Both plans recognize the responsibility of creditor countries to help cor-
rect the disequilibrium in the exchanges. In case of credit balances, of course,
no rigid maxima are proposed, nor do they deprive any member s.tate of any
of the facilities that it now possesses for receiving payment for its exports.
A creditor country may continue to employ the proceeds of its exports to
buy goods or investments abroad, to buy gold, or to make temporary ad-
vances. Creditor countries may be asked to adopt credit policies or trade and
tariff policies that will help to cure the disequilibrium, but there is no force
to compel the acceptance of such suggestions. The penalty would be the con-
tinued accumulation of credit balances. We have noted in a previous section
how much greater a country's obligation to extend credits. might be under
the Keynes plan than under the White plan.
The provision in the Keynes plan that the lending countries should pay
interest on their credit balances above a certain amount is most unusual.
The purpose is to induce creditor countries to take the steps necessary to
reduce their credit balances, but it is difficult to imagine the United States
or any other prospective creditor country agreeing to such a provision. It
appears to be a proposal to penalize a creditor country in order to induce it
to accept means of settlement that it would otherwise be unwilling to
accept.
Probably the United States will have a big favorable trade balance for
several years after the war. The rest of the world will need our goods, and
their problem will be to get dollars to pay for them. Not only would the
United States be the principal supplier of credits, but to make either plan
successful we would also have to supplement our credits with long-term loans.
We shall probably also continue to draw gold into the United States. Many
countries may use gold to buy dollars without going through the clearing
agency, since both plans contemplate the free use of gold in settling interna-
tional balances. In addition, gold might flow to the United States from the
Stabilization Fund, because much of the gold deposited with the Fund by
the various countries might be used to buy dollars.
EFFECT ON MONEY MARKETS
The Keynes plan seems to place much more emphasis on the management
of money markets as a means of aiding stabilization than does the White
'5plan. To remedy excessive credit balances, for example, Keynes advocates
measures of expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand as well
as steps to appreciate local currencies or increase money rates of earnings.
In countries developing excessive debit balances, he would reduce the value
of a member's currency, in terms of gold and other currencies, as an anti-
deflationary measure. In other words, the Keynes plan would involve a large.
degree of monetary management within each member nation by its govern-
ment, although in case of the creditor countries the ultimate decision would
be left to the country itself.
The operation of either plan, without monetary management, could affect
money markets very much as the importation and exportation of gold did
under the old gold standard; that is, the operations could be contractionary
in debtor countries and expansionary in creditor countries.6 Whether either
plan would actually work out that way, of course, would depend upon
whether the debtor and creditor countries proceed to offset the effects of the
operations of the plan on their money markets. If the creditor countries
should permit the expansionist effects and the debtor countries should offset
the contractionist effects, the general effect on the world would be expan-
sionist.
In the debtor country, the accumulation of local currency in the central
bank would tend to reduce the reserves of the commercial banks and have a
contractionist influence. This, according to standard monetary theory, would
tend over the long run to reduce prices in comparison with those in other
countries, encourage exports and discourage imports. If the debtor country,
however, should choose to offset this influence by central bank open-market
operations or other monetary activities, it could avoid contractionist pressure.
This, of course, might increase the time necessary to bring about conditions
of stability.
In the case of the creditor country, the purchase of foreign exchange from
the market by the central bank would increase commercial bank reserves,
6 John H. Williams has pointed out that the monetary mechanism provided in both plans is
essentially a gold standard mechanism. ("Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans,"
Fordgn Affairs, July p.648.)
A somewhat different viewpoint is presented by Joan Robinson who says: "Both schemes are
an improvement, from the point of view of deficit countries, not only on the gold standard, but
also on a regime of free exchanges. The gold standard imposes severe deflationary pressure on a
deficit country and forces it to redress its balance in the most disagreeable and wasteful manner.
Each scheme provides alternative and less painful methods of redress.... 'Whatis required
is a system in which deficit countries can depreciate to establish equilibrium, while surplus coun-
tries are prevented from indulging in 'exchange dumping' merely to increase their surpluses. A
scheme of international control of exchange rates, provided that it is genuinely international and
is not manipulated in favour of particular interests, promises great advantages to deficit coun-
tries, which would be well worth the sacrifice of national autonomy which it involves." ("The
International Currency Proposals," The Economic Journal, June-September 1943,pp.171-72.)
i6thereby producing an expansionist tendency; prices might tend to rise, which
would encourage imports and discourage exports. Here again, a country
could offset this influence just as it can offset the effect of gold imports.
Under the Keynes plan the United States would finance debtor countries
with Federal Reserve Bank credit to the extent of our credit balance, and the
possible extent of that credit balance as shown in a previous section indicates
what a burden this financing might become. The banks and dealers in for-
eign exchange would sell their surplus holdings of foreign exchange to the
Federal Reserve Banks and the latter would in turn receive a credit balance
in bancor. To the extent of our credit balance, therefore, operations under
the Clearing Union would be just as expansionist as if we imported gold for
the same amount, because they would increase member bank reserves. But
this expansionist tendency would not be limited by the amount of available
gold; it would be an addition to the influence of gold imports. The effects
could be offset, of course, if the Federal Reserve authorities had sufficient
securities to sell in the open market or sufficient powers to raise reserve re-
quirements. Regardless of the ability of the Federal Reserve System to offset
expansionist effects, the suggestion for financing the balance of payments
through central bank credit should receive critical examination to determine
its various implications. The time might come when the assets behind our
own Federal Reserve notes and behind member bank reserves would con-
sist in some part of bancor which in turn would be backed by a miscellaneous
assortment of weak currencies.
The White plan would have a similar expansionist effect to the extent
that the Stabilization Fund should borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks.
Such borrowing might be substantial, since that apparently would be the
principal means for the Fund to acquire additional dollars after the original
contribution of dollars and gold becomes exhausted.
It may be, however, that many countries would continue to manage their
money markets with a view to domestic policies rather than for the pur-
pose of curing debit or credit balances, especially if there should be a conflict
between domestic policy and international policy. Some countries may be
committed to high employment or to specific social policies, even if it means
unbalanced budgets. Others may feel committed to stable interest rates for
many years because of the conditions created by war financing. It is aques-
tion, therefore, to what extent they would permit the operation of an in-
ternational stabilization mechanism to interfere with these internal policies.
LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES
WHITE PLAN—in addition to agreements by the member countries to cooperate in
carrying out the plan, to adopt appropriate legislation, to furnish information to
'7the Fund, and to give consideration to the views and recommendations of the
Fund, there are some specific limitations imposed upon the actions of each coun-
try, such as agreement:
a. Not to alter exchange rates without the consent of the Fund, except within
the io percent limit permitted;
b. Not to undertake exchange dealings with other countries that would un-
dermine stability of exchange rates established by the Fund;
c. To abandon as soon as conditions permit all restrictions over foreign ex-
change transactions with other member countries (except on capital transfers)
and not to impose additional restrictions (except on capital transfers) without
the consent of the Fund;
d. Not to enter upon any new bilateral clearing arrangements, or to engage
in multiple currency practices, except with the approval of the Fund; and
e. To cooperate eflectively with other member countries which adopt or con-
tinue controls over international capital movements.
KEYNES PLAN—While the limitations imposed upon member countries by the
Keynes plan are not always stated as specifically as in the White plan, they are
clearly implied and quite similar. For example, a member state may not alter the
value of its currency in terms of bancor without the permission of the Governing
Board, except under certain stated conditions, and may not purchase or acquire
gold at a price in excess of the price fixed by the Governing Board. Member states
also agree to refrain from certain restrictive measures, such as import regulations
and higher import duties, except under certain conditions.
Keynes suggests that the Clearing Union might become the instrument and
the support of international policies in addition to those which it is its primary
purpose to promote. He suggests that the Union might become the pivot of the
future economic government of the world. "There are various methods," he says,
"by which the Clearing Union could use its influence and its powers to maintain
stability of prices and to control the Trade Cycle. if an international Economic
Board is established, this Board and the Clearing Union might be expected to
work in close collaboration to their mutual advantage. if an international in vest-
ment or Development Corporation is also set up together with a scheme of Coin-
modity Controls for the control of stocks of the staple primary products, we might
come to possess in these three institutions a powerful means of combating the
evils of the Trade Cycle, by exercising contractionist or expansionist influence on
the system as a whole or on particular sections."
Adherence to either plan calls for some suspension of sovereign rights;
for example, the right to alter exchange rates, or the right to impose new
exchange restrictions without the consent of the central agency, or the right
to follow credit and financial policies disadvantageous to other countries. Any
international organization or association involves the giving up or suspension
of some freedom of action by the individual countries. The organizations pro-
posed here, however, are not endowed with irrevocable powers because these
powers can always be changed by vote of the member nations. Furthermore, a
member country always has the option of withdrawing, although there might
i8be some adverse effects on the country withdrawing, especially if it is a small
country.
Besides these specific limitations on the powers of member countries, we
have already noted that both plans either imply or would probably lead to
rather broad international economic controls. The controls over capital move-
ments, for example, in order to be successful and accomplish their purpose,
might well involve controls over all international transactions. There is also
implied in the plans, more specifically in the Keynes plan, substantial influ-
ence over the money markets of the individual countries. As a rule the con-
trol of money markets is left to the member countries themselves, but agree-
ment to cooperate with the central agency and to take measures for promot-
ing stability involves some degree of obligation to .adopt such controls. But
it is not always clear how far the powers of the central agency would go
and how much pressure could be exerted on debtor countries.
WITHDRAWALS AND SUSPENSIONS
WHITE PLAN—Any country may withdraw from the Fund by giving notice, and
its withdrawal will take effect one year from the date of such notice.
A country failing to meet its obligations to the Fund may be suspended by a
majority of the member countries and at the end of one year the country shall be
automatically dropped from membership unless it has been restored to good stand-
ing by a majority of the member countries. The rights of the Fund shall be fully
safeguarded.
KEYNES PLAN—Members may withdraw from the Union on a year's notice, sub-
ject to mating satisfactory arrangement to discharge any debit balance. Similarly,
the Governing Board may require the withdrawal of a member on the same notice
if the latter is in breach of agreements relating to the Union.
BLOCKED FOREIGN BALANCES
WHIm PLAN—During the first two years, the Fund may buy from the govern-
ments of member countries blocked foreign balances held in other member coun-
tries, provided that the amount of the balances purchased does not exceed in the
aggregate io percent of the quotas. At the end of two years the Fund shall propose
a plan for the gradual further liquidation of blocked balances, and shall indicate
the proportion of blocked balances that can be appropriately purchased under this
pro vision.
KEYNES PLAN—The plan provides no detailed treatment for blocked balances, but
its author suggests that special provision be made for converting blocked war bal-
ances into bancor.
These blocked balances refer to balances blocked for lack of foreign ex-
change, such as the sterling balances now being accumulated in London by
India and other countries. They do not include the balances blocked in the
United States for political reasons.
'9Blocked sterling balances aggregate well over $4 billion now and are grow-
ing rapidly. A substantial proportion of these balances belongs to Empire
countries, India being the largest holder. Some of them can probably be
settled directly with the countries concerned, either by refunding or by the
shipment of manufactured goods from England.7 England will probably
need substantial financial aid in dealing with blocked balances, but it is
essentially a long-term operation and not a function of an exchange stabil-
ization agency.
OTHER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AGENCIES
WHIm PLAN—In a memorandum attached to a letter inviting the ministers of
finance of 37 countries to send technical experts to Washington to discuss sugges-
tions for an International Stabilization Fund, the Secretary of the United States
Treasury said in part: "It is recognized that an international stabilization fund is
only one of the instrumentalities which may be needed in the field of international
economic cooperation.. Other agencies are also needed to provide capital for post-
war reconstruction and development, to provide funds for rehabilitation and re-
lief, and to promote stability in the prices of primary international commodities."
The United States Treasury made public on October 8, 1943,anoutline of a
proposed plan for a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development
for the purpose of encouraging or providing long-term credits for the development
of the productive resources of member countries. Its capital would be billion,
of which 20percentwould be paid in initially. Twenty percent of each payment
would be made in gold.
The bank could guarantee icians made with private capital, participate in private
capital loans, or make loans from its own resources when private loans are not
available on reasonable terms.
The bank would deal only with or through governments of member countries,
their central banks and fiscal agencies, and wit/i or through international financial
agencies that are owned predominantly by member governments. But with the
approval of member countries the bank may guarantee international loans placed
in their countries.
The board of directors would consist of one director, or alternate, appointed by
each member government. The voting power of member countries would be
closely related to their share holdings.
KLYNES PLAN—In the preface to the Keynes plan, four main lines of approach to
postwar problems are suggested:
a. The mechanism of currency and exchange,
b. The framework of a commercial policy regulating conditions for exchange
of goods, tariffs, and the like,
c.Orderly conduct of production, distribution, and prices of primary products,
and
d. In vestment aid, both medium- and long-term, for countries whose eco-
nomic development needs assistance from outside.
The preface states further that while all these matters will need to be handled
Cf. London Economist, August 7, 1943, pp. i8o-8i.
20in due course, it appears convenient to give priority to the mechanism of currency
and exchange.
As emphasized earlier, the sponsors of both plans contemplate that
there will be other instrumentalities for promoting international economic
cooperation and that these agencies will cooperate with and assist each other.
Stabilization plans of the kind proposed might have a better chance of
success if coupled with other undertakings, especially with measures for
handling relief and for making long-term reconstruction and development
loans. The Treasury's plan for a world bank, as well as plans for postwar
relief, will doubtless be considered along with plans for stabilization as parts
of a general program of postwar financial reconstruction. The general feasi-
bility of the plans, however, is the subject of the next section.
NOTE: Two French financial experts have also made public a plan for stabilizing exchanges.
This plan proposes that the principal nations conclude a monetary accord, similar
towhich other United Nations would be invited to adhere. The official
parities of the currencies of participating countries would be fixed and would not be changed
without consultation or agreement. The stability of these exchange rates would be maintained
by the monetary authorities of each country through the acquisition and holding of the exchange
of other participating countries. Foreign exchange thus held could be utilized for payments to
be made in such currencies. The' amount of exchange a country's monetary authorities agree to
acquire would be limited and each country would guarantee the holder against depreciation of
its currency by the deposit, on demand, of collateral(gold, foreignbills, approved secur-
ities, raw materials, etc.) up to a specified percentage of the amount of sue/i currency held by
another participating country. As this virtual opening of mutual credits would involve inflation-
ary risk,, a method of sterilization is suggested to counteract this tendency whenever advisable.
It is felt that the system would operate more smoothly if the monetary authorities of the par-
ticipating countries were constantly in close contact, although an International Clearing Office' is
not considered an essential condition for the functioning of the plan. New York Times. May 9, 1943.
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